1960 Liberal Democratic Party presidential election

Liberal Democratic Party presidential election (1960 ねんじゆうみんしゅとうそうさいせんきょ) is election to elect the president of the Liberal Democratic Party performed on July 14, 1960 for 1,960 years.

Table of contents

Summary

With President Nobusuke Kishi taking the responsibility for the security treaty struggle on June 23, 1960, and having performed an order of intention to resign, I was carried out in order to decide President Prime Minister next term.

The bank thought that it was preferable to unify candidates by initiative of oneself at first, but Hayato Ikeda, Banboku Ono, Mitsujiro Ishii, Aiichiro Fujiyama, five of Kenzo Matsumura showed the intention of the candidacy [¹]; [²] [³]. Ono of the vice-president might become the president temporarily if I went by talks route, but was opposed to Ono and Ishii that insisted on talks without that is why Ikeda refusing talks, and insisting on election by popular vote, and accepting it in all talks stubbornly [⁴]. The manner of Ikeda who insisted on election by popular vote was extremely reflected in the high-handed attitude and it was terrible and, for several days before the election by popular vote, was swatted with "obstinate guys" with a newspaper on TV [⁵].

At first Ikeda expresses the candidacy formally, and, on July 5, Ono follows on 8th. Fujiyama said that "how about if you ran" in the bank on 10th was recommended for Saeki Ozawa, Masumi Esaki, Saburo Endo and others and expressed the candidacy on 10th [⁶], but it was on 12th, and it was said to the bank "you stopped you, the candidacy, and will you help Ikeda?" again [⁶]. On 10th, Ishii and Matsumura expressed the 擁 せられて candidacy as "the representative of the anti-mainstream faction" in the Miki, Matsumura group, too [⁵]. When Yoshida clarified Ikeda support, Ono, both Ishii groups formed alliance front of two or three rank. I decided it in carrying out election by popular vote without Chief Secretary Shojiro Kawashima selecting a party convention as July 13 because the Ikeda support vs. Ono, the opposition of both Ishii groups intensified, and unifying it if possible, and carrying out election by popular vote when it was unavoidable.

Ikeda had strongly insisted on the action for public peace and order of the Self-Defense Forces in the middle of security treaty struggle [⁷], and a direction to consider that a bank route was succeeded to in the Ikeda Administration was strong [⁸]. Matsutaro Shoriki who was the existence of the elder of the LDP felt uneasy about it "can Ikeda who persisted in assuming a resolute attitude get the situation under control in the middle of this confusion as expected?" [⁹]. Kiichi Miyazawa of the Ikeda aide was called to come by Asahi Shimbun article chief editor, Shintaro Ryu, and Mitsujiro Ishii of the Asahi Shimbun alumnus was recommended saying "I thought that it was necessary to lose the opposition such as an authoritative figure and the ruled, and the fierce warrior like Ikeda might work after such a society was desolate, but wants you to hand over the president to a moderate person of the character because you might deepen opposition and did not need to be able to work a little" and was asked when I wanted Ikeda to tell [⁹]. Because Miyazawa thought, "LDP itself may catch the fatal blow if Ikeda with an insolent image became the prime minister following a high-handed bank" [¹⁰], an advice street, the hearts of the people of the shade insisted on Ishii of the calm personality to calm down [¹¹]. Both Miyazawa and Ohira objected to the candidacy of the president election by popular vote if premature [¹⁰], but one's game どきだと felt intuitionally, and Ikeda turned down advice flatly saying "what's called government was seen, and there is the government before me to eyes to compromise" [¹²].

Eisaku Sato thought about the candidacy at first, too, but I expected a short life saying "you should work as a honest person to the president of such times earlier" even if Ikeda took the government and was made to be prudent about the presidential election candidacy by Shigeru Yoshida in Yoshida and was made to persuade to support Ikeda [⁹]. There was that the Sato group felt uneasy about it saying "the times of Sato may fade away when Ikeda became the prime minister" but I handed the political power to a party politician outside the consideration, and the inside was confused [⁵]. The bank had a feeling to want to make Sato of the younger brother succession for some time past, too, but it was a younger brother, but the person said, and Fujiyama was good, but there was not power in Fujiyama, and, judging from intra-party power relations, unreasonableness and Sato judged it in Fujiyama, and, as for the true intention, the Sato group turned around in reliable sworn friends for Ikeda support next to an older brother immediately without going after all [¹³]. The bank feigned official neutrality, but, in consultation with Yoshida and Okinori Kaya, is said to have decided Ikeda support [¹⁴].

The selection of succession fell into confusion as I was said to be it if virtual division was in an intense state in the LDP to compete that intra-party faction opposition was given to the front [¹⁵]. In the bank group, three was divided, and, as for the bank, the Takeo Fukuda and others, Shojiro Kawashima, the Munenori Akagi and others supported Ono Ikeda support with a Sato group, and Kentaro Ayabe, Tokuo Nanjo, the Yuki Takechi and others supported Fujiyama, and Hisato Ichimada was an Ishii group [¹]. On July 11 two days before the meeting, Ono, Ishii, Kawashima, 10,000 fields, Tatsunosuke Takasaki, six people of Matsutaro Shoriki talked together by an effort of Ichiro Kawano and proposed agreement, "bank imitator government objection" "bureaucratic government objection" to "the party politician concentration" [¹]. However, the concentration of the party politician was cutting both ways. Main Kawano and Takeo Miki of the thing with the effect to widen a range of the support were absent from a plenary session of the voting of security treaty [⁴]. It was the act that was unforgivable for the bank which risked political life for security treaty [⁴]. The bank abnormally disliked Miki in particular with "a guy most hateful in the world" [¹⁶]. Sato, the motive power of the Ishii loyalist were Kawano, but, as for the staff officer of the Ikeda loyalist, what I really draw out a Sato group and summarized in Ikeda support is said to be Kakuei Tanaka [¹³]. Takeo Kimura, Tomisaburo Hashimoto, Kiichi Aichi, four people of Yorizo Matsuno were anti-Ikeda, but, in the Sato group, the concentration in the group became from a sense of impending crisis done by Kawano if the inside of the Sato group was disturbed [¹⁷]. When became the election by popular vote, the Ikeda group, the Ishii group, the Ono group simulated it when one's camp was elected all you [¹⁸]; [¹⁹].

The situation changed suddenly in dead of the night of July 12. When there were the prospects of success enough if I made two or three rank combination, I stepped on Ono, both Ishii groups, but there was not it, and Hirokichi Nadao who received instructions of Ishii met the Mikio Mizuta, Masashi Aoki, Isamu Murakami and others who were the staff officer of the Ono group, and the Ishii group told the situation that a member of the House of Councilors was levelled by the Ikeda group and could fight saying "there is not the Ishii group in the situation met in expectation even if an Ono group expected it in two or three rank alliance" [¹⁸]. This is because it was cautious of an Ishii group having collapsed when there is Kawano behind Ono [¹⁷]. When a prospect is not in sight in the association of two or three rank with the Ishii group, there are not the prospects of success of Ono. Kawashima and Kawano, Yoshio Kodama rushed, too, and great rating began around Ono [¹⁷], and Kawano persuaded Ono, and, in spite of the early morning, Ono declined the candidacy at half past 6 on the early morning of 13th [³]; [²⁰]. Even if unity is firm, and Ono goes down the Ono group, it can gather votes in Ishii that Ono went down, but this is because it was expected that the vote of the Ishii group drifts to Ikeda when Ishii goes down [¹⁹]. Matsumura cancels a run depending on this, and the Miki, Matsumura group expresses Ishii support [²¹] and, against a bank, Ikeda, the bureaucratic group alliance of Sato, decides a policy to unify candidates in Ishii, and to cross the party politician alliance [¹⁸]. The presidential election became the fight of three people of Ikeda, Ishii, Fujiyama.

The upsurge of the party politician at this point in time was whispered to, "Ikeda lost" terribly. However, the party politician got a wrong measures war [¹⁹]. I am told that Ishii was elected if I bring it into the election by popular vote on schedule on this day [¹]. However, therefore, the party politician chose to postpone on 1st without a recital of Yoshie Fujiwara being planned in the Sankei hall at the night of this day, and being usable for a long time [²²]. In this single night, the bank, the Sato and others did the system reconstruction of the Ikeda group. The financial world mainstream led by "the financial world four Four Devas" who was close to Ikeda and were always cautious of Ichiro Kawano urged a bank eagerly [²³]; [¹]. To receive this, and that the bank which left the report of the Ikeda group to Kazuto Sato gathers 60 bank groups till then and to concentrate it again once again and support Ikeda; persuasion [¹⁰] [²⁴]. This strategy succeeded and Shojiro Kawashima who was one of the midwifes of the party politician took a group plainly and turned around for support of Ikeda [²⁵]. Yorizo Matsuno states, "I was asked for Ikeda by excellent しとしていなかったが, distantly related Yoshida because the bank was tormented in various ways by Ikeda" when "the next make Ikeda" [²⁶]. The Fujiyama group did not decline the candidacy from the principle which "let a muscle go through" [³] and clarified a manner called the Ikeda support by the second ballot, and Ikeda loyalist made a recovery at a stretch.

On July 14, 1960, I moved a meeting place to the Hibiya public hall, and Ikeda, Ishii, the election by three of Fujiyama were carried out, and Ikeda won a great victory in this way [²⁷]. Of course the main reason that Ikeda was able to achieve a role to break through a crisis of the main group of a conservative party has the luck, but it may be said that I looked good with decision of Ikeda and pushing of the brainy person [¹⁰]. The bank was hit by terrorism, and, in the afternoon of the day, was due for a serious wound in the middle of the new president banquet in the Prime Minister's office, and it was the bad end of the aftertaste [¹⁷]; [²⁸]. I am said to be the accommodation bill which I promised President for in the next term said that a bank handed the reason that I was stabbed in to all four people earlier when related [²⁹].

It is said that the Ikeda camp set the record-breaking live cartridge bomb which is said to be a total of 1 billion yen backed by the financial world mainstream [²²]. In contrast, it is said that the live cartridge which Ono prepared was 300 million yen [³⁰]. Kawashima is said to have paid 30 million yen to Ono later [²²]. But Ohira left a stagehand of 宏池会 to states Ikeda, it "is said to be "which does not turn out to be it to spend" penny, money and carried out, in fact, just what" [³¹].

Result

First electoral round

	The number of votes
Hayato Ikeda	246 votes
Mitsujiro Ishii	196 votes
Aiichiro Fujiyama	49 votes
Kenzo Matsumura	Five votes
Banboku Ono	One vote
Eisaku Sato	One vote

• Because the presidential election at that time was not a candidacy system, I was treated all as an effective vote if it was the vote for the Diet member of the LDP position.
• Because no candidate got the majority by the first vote, the runoff by two high ranks was carried out.

I it as a result of run-off primary

	The number of votes
Hayato Ikeda	302 votes
Mitsujiro Ishii	194 votes

Elected candidate

• Hayato Ikeda

Remarks

• After this presidential election, an order "to write the note of contents to protest plutocracy of Ikeda by the name of Banboku Ono" to Tsuneo Watanabe who did the ghostwriter of the LDP politician from "Sunday every day" came in those days. I was said to be "it was said, and it was said and left it" even if I said "will you see a manuscript?" with the condition "that I wrote in the appropriateness to chase" if Ono was generous, and "may I write it though I was asked for a note by Ono, "Sunday every day"?" and Watanabe heard it. So I wrote 30 pieces of articles "伴睦 here where the plot politics was not permitted to on "Sunday daily life" July 31, 1960 with a title called advancing in the face of death" with the appearance of the note of Ono. The manuscript fee of Watanabe at the time was one piece of 1,000 yen, but the manuscript fee that I wrote by the name of Ono was 300,000 yen for one piece of 10,000 yen. 渡邊の月給は当時2万円だったので、思わぬ大金が入り毎晩後輩記者を飲ませていたら「渡邊が派閥を作っている」と言われたという[³²]。 なお、大野は池田が一年生ながら大蔵大臣に抜擢された際に、猛反発する党人派を宥めて池田を推したことから、大野と池田は仲が良く、大野が「池田は正々堂々と(?)戦ってくれた。池田に恨みは全くない」と渡邊に「池田に言って衆議院議長を取ってきてくれ」と頼み、渡邊が仲の良い大平に頼んだが、衆議院議長はダメで副総理を予定したが、佐藤栄作が反対し、1962年の第2次池田内閣 (第2次改造)のとき、副総理に就任している[³³]。

脚注

1. ^ ^{a b c d e} 宮崎, pp. 246-253.
2. ^ もう一人の立役者　大野伴睦（５）総裁選で苦杯、池田体制の支柱に
3. ^ ^{a b c} 第112回　藤山愛一郎（その三）選挙資金調達で財産を使い果たす。だが、「いささかも悔いは残らない」
4. ^ ^{a b c} 北岡, pp. 97-100.
5. ^ ^{a b c} 大下, pp. 18-47.
6. ^ ^{a b} 藤山, pp. 116-128.
7. ^ 【安保改定の真実 (8) 完】 岸信介の退陣 佐藤栄作との兄弟酒「ここで二人で死のう」
8. ^ 塩口, pp. 194-197.
9. ^ ^{a b c} 沢木, pp. 20-23.
10. ^ ^{a b c d} 藤井, pp. 225-229.
11. ^ 東京新聞, pp. 157-161.
12. ^ 自民党広報, pp. 165-181; 歴史街道, pp. 32-37.
13. ^ ^{a b} 松野, pp. 30-34、59、130、160-161.
14. ^ 賀屋, pp. 268-274; 原, pp. 222-223.
15. ^ 武田, pp. 61-62.
16. ^ 原, pp. 152-153.
17. ^ ^{a b c d} 北國新聞, pp. 187-197.
18. ^ ^{a b c} "文相6期、日教組の勤評闘争と対決 「群雀中の一鶴」灘尾弘吉 (3)". 日本経済新聞 (日本経済新聞社). (2012年1月22日). http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFK1601N_X10C12A1000000/ 2016年2月5日閲覧。 
19. ^ ^{a b c} 大野, pp. 151-156.
20. ^ 渡邉回顧録, pp. 483-486.
21. ^ "周首相と会談、LT貿易に道筋 「日中関係に賭けた情熱」松村謙三(7) -p2". 日本経済新聞 (日本経済新聞社). (2012年4月15日). http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFK0901H_Z00C12A4000000/?df=2 2016年2月8日閲覧。 "日中関係冬の時代にパイプつなぐ 「日中関係に賭けた情熱」松村謙三（8）". 日本経済新聞 (日本経済新聞社). (2012年4月22日). http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFK28014_Y1A121C1000000/ 2016年4月25日閲覧。 
22. ^ ^{a b c} 魚住, pp. 126-129.
23. ^ 自民党の歴史 長期政権化とそのひずみ 社会ニュースAll About
24. ^ 石破氏"変心"の舞台裏…首相側近の「禅譲」論にコロリ！？
25. ^ 戦後の日本, pp. 195-198; 渡邉回顧録, pp. 178-183.
26. ^ 松野, p. 116.
27. ^ 歴史劇画 大宰相（4） - 講談社BOOK倶楽部
28. ^ 写真特集:日米安全保障条約 デモ隊が国会突入（2010年6月掲載） - 毎日jp(毎日新聞)
29. ^ 北國新聞, pp. 161-172.
30. ^ 戦後の日本, pp. 195-198.
31. ^ 福永, pp. 87-88.
32. ^ 渡邊回顧録, pp. 164-167.
33. ^ 渡邊回顧録, pp. 178-183.

参考文献

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