Trouble of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

By the trouble (ふくしまだいいちげんしりょくはつでんしょの trouble) of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, I explain the trouble that happened before an explosion accident of March, 2011 among the troubles that occurred in Tokyo Electric Power Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

Quantitative tendency

Jun Tateno settles the number of troubles of each plane until 1997 as follows.

The first unit: 68 [¹]
The second unit: 42 [²]
The third unit: 24 [³]
The fourth unit: Ten [⁴]
The fifth unit: 18 [⁵]
The sixth unit: 14 [⁶]

A tendency with much malfunction was seen with a plant built early and was touched such a tendency with the book of Tateno, but did not have the stress corrosion breaking problem that let the rate of operation of the 1-3 machine be sluggish in the plumbing in the late 1970s because I fed back the experience of the precedence machine after the fourth unit according to the answer when "investment economy" reported in 1980 and included a remedy from a beginning [⁷].

List of troubles

Follows are the news, parts of the announced trouble, and the small accident occurs from the beginning of construction [^{note 1}].

I refer to "the atomic energy accident"

Waste fluid leak accident radioactive on June 25, 1973: The outbreak time was 16:32, and the cause was a mistake of the workers. At this chance Tokyo Electric Power removes pollution soil and treated water containing the remaining waste fluid, but it is said that the exposure dose of the worker whom I engaged in was not a thing more than safety standards. However, I knew the communication to Okuma-machi without what only after comment was demanded from a joint communication reporter at 16:00 on June 26. I reported Tokyo Electric Power at 14:10 on 26th, but, in Okuma-machi, I strongly criticize that it passed from an accident for 22 hours at that point and recollect saying "it is unavoidable even if I ignore a hometown and lose the in some cases trust" [⁸].
April 2, 1976 second unit accident: A fire occurred in the yard, but was not announced outside. However, the outbreak of the accident became clear by the whistle-blowing that I addressed to Soichiro Tahara, and Tokyo Electric Power accepted the outbreak of the accident one month of the accusation later. Tokyo Electric Power explained, "a spark of the welding spread to cloth for the cleaning", but the cable of the power plant really caught fire, and the rumor that Tokyo Electric Power employee burnt with rag cloth for near a duct for camouflage drifted between subcontract employees [⁹]. Caused all AC power supply loss accidents by the cable fire by Browns ferry (en) of the same type; Tokyo Electric Power carried out fireproof painting construction in cables after this fire just after that in the whole area in the building. Shin Morie criticizes this matter as official announcement and a real estrangement example [¹⁰].
Fatal accident by the 1977 crash disaster: According to Shin Morie, it is said that the fatal accident by the crash disaster occurs in a tank room in 1977. Besides, the victim rescued then will maintain the inspection of the hall body counter before the conveyance to a hospital and the conveyance was several hours later, but, according to the coverage to a worker, does it when I announced that Tokyo Electric Power conveyed it just after that [¹¹].
November 2, 1978 third unit accident: I was considered to be a first Japanese criticality accident, but it was March 22, 2007 29 years after the accident outbreak, and what was announced was after. In about 2007, Tokyo Electric Power reexamined the past record to do the scrubbed finish of the disgraceful affair that occurred successively in those days. The thing communication that the measurement record of the neutron of the third unit core had a problem in Tokyo Electric Power from TOSHIBA on the night of March 21 became available. According to the report, it was written down that the state indicating the measurement limit of the record lasted approximately seven and a half hours in November, 1978, and the third unit person on duty (Tokyo Electric Power employee) at the time testified saying "I think that I directed it to put it again because a control rod fell out when I went to my office in the morning, and the numerical value of the neutron went up it". The cause was an operation error of the return valve which regulated the water pressure of the control rod, and similar control rod falling off was up in the second unit fifth unit, seven months later three months after a case of November, 1978. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun points out the possibility that I was able to prevent the later accident if I develop information horizontally when an accident of November happened [¹²].
Accident (号機不明) addicted to hydrogen sulfide for 1,978 years: There is the danger for the worker as well as radioactivity, and, according to Shin Morie, a poisoning accident by the hydrogen sulfide gets up by the second system plumbing in 1978 and does it though I can expect outbreak of the hydrogen sulfide gas as the reason easily when there was not the analyzer which is satisfied with the spot [¹³].
January, 1980 first unit periodical inspection: There was cleaning work to prevent welding defectiveness before the plumbing welding work in the nuclear reactor building in people called S (anonymity) of the local farming family who began work with Norio Hirai, Hirai, and the witness entered in with bottom 10 several of the supervision of Hirai. The pollution degree was B area [^{note 2}], but S and another one person exposed a high dose of radioactivity cover, and all the members were particularly approximately high in the place of 1000 counts more than 5000 counts about S, and the average of the worker at the time was 524,866 counts even if I carried out the measurement with the hall body counter after work many times. Thereafter S was reshuffled for the work in the area where had low pollution degree by the work in the furnace, but needed three years four months on that day before I returned to a common count [¹⁴]. Furthermore, S was from time when what knew the value by oneself for the first time fell down to 32000 counts without knowing it until I came so that I entered in 1986, and Hirai and Onda heard the value of the hall body of the day of the work. In addition, after a day of the work, I was troubled by tiredness and a headache, the bleeding from the gums [¹⁵]. Because Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident occurred afterwards, and interest in nuclear power generation increased, S consulted you by an introduction of Jinzaburo Takagi at a hospital of Osaka and was diagnosed in the sign of the radiation exposure symptom being seen, but after inquiring of Tokyo Electric Power after having reported this whole story in on May 24, 1986 in "the weekly publication present age", was the answer with the exposure dose in the maximum permissible dose [¹⁶].
May 12, 1981 second unit scrum: Abnormality occurred to the power-supply unit of "the water supply line" which returned a coolant from the condenser to the nuclear reactor in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station second unit on May 12, 1981, and high pressure condensation pump, feed pump four in total stopped like a chain reaction, and the trouble that water did not come back to occurred, and scrum was finally hung in the nuclear reactor. At this chance a main steam isolation dialect was closed so that the water which collected in a pressure vessel did not fall out, but I had opened for nearly 20 minutes without missing already a kind of valve for the uniformity to keep below the pressure to receive collapse heat at this time, and to increase mentioned above, the main steam, and a safety valve repeating opening and closing it, and the steam which occurred continued being thrown away. Meanwhile, the member of driving rebooted the pump which stopped once and revived water supply [¹⁷]. Hisataka Yamazaki reboots the pump with the question for trust about the operation of the member of driving once by having stopped by abnormality, and it is only said that a claim, water level show the position that is higher than the fuel top when a coolant should have considered steam and the possibility that it is by decompression boiling rapidly, and, in what I miss the main steam and open the safety valve and decompressed from 70 standard atmosphere at the time of the normal driving to 25 standard atmosphere, water criticizes the judgment that did not supplement water immediately [¹⁸].; In addition, this trouble became clear when a trouble of the scrum occurred in the second unit on September 29, 1992 without the fact that ECCS operated being announced in those days [²] when the Agency for Natural Resource and Energy showed the list of past ECCS operation accidents depending on the demand of media. Because a straight chart and the change document of the accident were offered by the trouble of September, 1992, the citizen group demanded additional information disclosure, but because "it passed in a preservation term, I replied it saying it does not remain as for what", and there remained it as information only the document which Tokyo Electric Power submitted to a Diet member at the time of 1981 publicly [¹⁹]. Because there was a leak accident of the radioactive waste fluid as for Hisataka Yamazaki at The Japan Atomic Power Co. Tsuruga power station as the background where concealment of trouble was carried out for for 18 days a month on last month 4 of the accident, I show the fact that the Fukushima assembly is on the day of the accident and made an on-site inspection of to Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on May 12. Because the accident outbreak was late-night 0:17, it was possible, but, as for the report, Tokyo Electric Power really reported a fact of the ECCS operation only to the Agency for Natural Resource and Energy without attachment of the analysis on the chronological order without telling the investigating group saying "there was the nuclear reactor stop by the water level drop". Therefore the investigating group inspects it mainly on the waste fluid disposal facilities which became the problem in Tsuruga accident, and because there is not a problem by assembly statement of July 1, report it, and get; that eat it [²⁰].
November, 1982 fourth unit periodical inspection: I have let an unripe employee operates a wrong valve during periodical inspection of the fourth unit in the place that Katsunobu Onda reported on to Norio Hirai in 1982 through 1983, and contaminated water flow out into the air conditioning duct, and it is said that it is highly-concentrated and I gather the workers of the supervision level and have processed a polluted duct behind closed doors. Tokyo Electric Power admits that a similar accident matched indication in November, 1982, but does not recognize it about the radiation exposure of the excess [²¹].
September 9, 1990 third unit accident: Nuclear reactor pressure rose and automatically stopped it by a signal of "the amount of neutron flux" as a result that the pin which stopped a main steam isolation valve was broken. INES level 2.
The February 22, 1998 fourth unit: During periodical inspection, 34 of them of 137 control rods fell out a one-25th (as for 1 notch approximately 15cm) of the whole for 50 minutes.
July, 2000 1-6 machine: It was found out by whistle-blowing to Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency that the data manipulation such as examination of past voluntary check records was carried out, and data manipulation recognized a done fact, and leaders formation such as president Jikisai Minami at the time assumed the responsibility and resigned Tokyo Electric Power in 2002 (concealment of Tokyo Electric Power Nuclear Power Plant trouble case).
All August, 2004 plant reexamination: By the confession by former employee of the aggregate manufacturer where I delivered gravel for the concrete used at the time of this power station, construction of the Fukushima second Nuclear Power Plant on August 13 to, I forged results book of the alkali-aggregate reaction-related examination, and the fact that passed through a guarantee of quality was reported (^[22] that a similar problem by the construction of the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant fourth unit was mainly reported at the time of the news). I ordered the investigation into facts and an investigation into about soundness concrete, and, in Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, a report was submitted to Tokyo Electric Power on October 22, the same year. On November 11, the visual investigation into all plants, the compressive strength measurement were carried out afterwards for 12 days by NISA [²³]. It was 1986 that a standard to affect an alkali silica-responsive examination was maintained, and an Orient machine mechanic in five one which I delivered aggregate to in a handling of building to reduce disarray solid waste forged the building completed after it. Other than an interview, I collate the results book that results book and the delivery supplier whom a third party engine holds hold and do it when soundness was confirmed [²⁴]. As a result of carrying out core collection, a promotion expansion examination regularly voluntarily than before about the building built before standard maintenance, and having inspected viewing in special examination, September in August, I do it when I confirmed that I exceed design standard strength [²⁵]. NISA judged a report of Tokyo Electric Power to be proper based on the investigation that I carried out by oneself in November [²⁶]. For preventive measures against recurrences, I received the examination results book original from a third party engine directly and decided to confirm the call by the staff of the third party engine at the time of shipment as sample pickpocket spare measures [²⁷].
The June 17, 2010 second unit: A water level drop accident. An accident to decrease water level in an arrowhead, the second unit which I was going to introduce plutonium-uranium mixed oxide fuel into for third unit pluthermal occurs [²⁸].
March 11, 2011 1.2.3.4 machine: Because I fell into "all AC power supply loss" state to lose the both sides of a power supply from the outside and the power supply with the emergency diesel generator in the power station by the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake and the tsunami caused by the earthquake generated on March 11, 2011, and the cooling function of the nuclear reactor was lost, a large quantity of radioactive material was released by meltdown. Level 7 that it is the worst as for the provisional evaluation by Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. I refer to an article of the process of The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster for the details and the process of the accident each.

Footnote

Explanatory note

As for the details of each ^ accident, see new Shea atomic energy facilities information disclosure library.
The use with three phases of A,B,C is accomplished as division indicating the pollution degree of the floor at the nuclear power plant at the time of ^ 1980, and a pollution degree cares about clothes low most A; is not necessary, but it is an entrance with the full gear in working clothes covering the whole body on a highly full-scale mask a pollution degree most in the case of C (Katsunobu Onda 2012, p. 49-50)

Source

^ Jun Tateno 2011, pp. 111.
^ ^a ^b Jun Tateno 2011, pp. 119.
^ Jun Tateno 2011, pp. 121.
^ Jun Tateno 2011, pp. 122.
^ Jun Tateno 2011, pp. 123.
^ Jun Tateno 2011, pp. 124.
It is investment economy editorial department 1980, p. about the stress corrosion breaking countermeasure of the plumbing that occurred early in driving with a ^ 1-3 machine 108
^ Okuma history book about the town editing Committee. 1985, p. 844 Chapter 4 electricity "accidents of the nuclear power generation"
^ Shin Morie 1995, p. 106.
^ Shin Morie 1979b, pp. 25.
It is Shin Morie 1979b, pp. about the indication of the crash disaster by ^ 森江 18
42 ^ "Nihon Keizai Shimbun" March 23, 2007 morning editions where "the recognition omission equivalence nuclear power plant of a criticality accident or the seriousness does not hold information sharing in TEPCO 78"
It is Shin Morie 1979b, pp. about the problems indication of the hydrogen sulfide accident by the second system plumbing by ^ 森江 18
It is Katsunobu Onda 2012, p. about the radiation exposure accident of ^ January, 1980 More than 49-54 "a normal value until I withdraw three years"
^ Katsunobu Onda 2012, p. 60.
^ Katsunobu Onda 2012, p. A 74-77 "reaction of diagnosis result and TEPCO"
^ 1993, Kuryuu, Yamasaki, pp. 268-270.
^ 1993, Kuryuu, Yamasaki, pp. 271-272.
^ 1993, Kuryuu, Yamasaki, pp. 266-267.
^ 1993, Kuryuu, Yamasaki, pp. 272.
^ Katsunobu Onda 1988.
^ "Tokai earthquake hits it directly, and is Hamaoka nuclear power plant all right?" "AERA" November 8, 2004 P29
本発電所についても触れている記述がある。
^ 原子力安全・保安院 2005, pp. 1.
^ 原子力安全・保安院 2005, pp. 2.
^ 原子力安全・保安院 2005, pp. 3.
^ 原子力安全・保安院 2005, pp. 4.
^ 原子力安全・保安院 2005, pp. 7.
^ "緊急冷却装置が稼働寸前に　福島第1原発で自動停止". 共同通信. (2010年6月17日)

参考文献

報告書

原子力安全・保安院 (2005-02-15). 東京電力株式会社福島第一及び福島第二原子力発電所の建物・構築物のアルカリ骨材反応に対する健全性の評価について (Report). 経済産業省原子力安全・保安院.

町史

大熊町史編纂委員会編. 『大熊町史. 第1巻 (通史)』大熊町 (福島県)、1985年3月。

雑誌

西山明「福島原発の下請け親方の被曝証言--私らは原発のイワシだ」、『技術と人間』第7巻第7号、技術と人間、1978年7月、 82-104頁、 NAID 40000627972。
森江信「いま,原発内労働はどうなっているか (恐怖の原発事故<特集>)」、『技術と人間』第8巻第6号、技術と人間、1979年6月、 10-29頁、 NAID 40000627802。
投資経済編集部「代替エネから八〇年代の主役に躍り出た東京電力福島第1第2原子力発電所」、『投資経済』、投資経済社、1980年11月15日、 106-111頁。
山崎久隆「隠された原発大事故--福島第1原発2号・1981年5月12日」、『世界』第586巻、岩波書店、1993年9月、 266-273頁、 NAID 40002107787。
恩田勝亘「元現場監督が衝撃暴露！ずさんな配管インチキ検査」、『週刊現代』、講談社、1988年12月17日。

書籍

森江信『原子炉被曝日記』技術と人間、1995年1月。ISBN 978-4-7645-0010-5。
舘野淳『廃炉時代が始まった―この原発はいらない』リーダーズノート; 復刊版、2011年8月。ISBN 9784903722368。（初出1999年）
恩田勝亘『福島原発現場監督の遺言』講談社、2012年2月。ISBN 9784062172141。

TranPedia

Wikipedia Translation from Japanese to English

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